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HUMAN RIGHTS IN TUNISIA: DILEMMAS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
EMMA C. MURPHY 
 
 
The European Union has repeatedly expressed its concern that the Southern Mediterranean 
Partner states (SMPs) should promote and protect human rights as defined by the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights and as recognised by those states in the Barcelona 
Declaration of 1995. Europe's concern is both normative, expressing a principled belief in 
the universal applicability of the human rights discourse, and pragmatic in so far as human 
rights and democracy are seen as necessary correlates of economic reform and development. 
In 1996 an Association Agreement came into effect linking Tunisia and Europe through a 
series of economic, security and political "baskets", or common agendas. Human rights and 
democratisation were seen by Europe to be a fundamental condition of economic assistance 
and the opening of European markets to Tunisian products. Yet, despite its own claims to 
have significantly advanced the human rights agenda in Tunisia, and to have introduced a 
level of political pluralism unseen since independence, the Tunisian regime has come under 
consistent attack from human rights organisations and even the EU itself for its own human 
rights abuses and for the increased centralisation of political power. This paper examines the 
accusations levelled against Tunisia, and the Tunisian regime's defence, through the lens of 
Tunisian political history. The case raises important questions for the EU in terms of the 
ambiguities and inconsistencies in its own policies and policy-making processes.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The European Union has shown an increasing concern since the mid-1980s with the 
human rights of both its own inhabitants and those of the countries with which it 
trades. The preamble of the Single European Act included a statement to the effect 
that the promotion and protection of human rights was a cornerstone to the 
international relations of the European Union, a reference repeated in the Lomé IV 
Convention of 1989. In 1991, human rights were linked to the issue of democracy in 
the Declaration on Human Rights by the European Council of Luxembourg (28-29 
June) and again in the Council's Resolution on human rights, democracy and 
development (28 November).1 The Treaty of the European Union itself introduces 
human rights and respect for democratic norms and the rule of law as fundamental 
requirements for EU membership and guiding principles of collective activities. Not 
surprisingly then, human rights found their way into the Barcelona Declaration of 
1995, with all EU members and the southern Mediterranean partner states (SMPs) 
committing themselves to act in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on 
Human Rights, the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law. 
Subsequent association agreements between the EU and SMPs included a political 
basket, part of which demanded the promotion and protection of human rights. Again, 
the linkage was made between the desirability of democratisation in SMPs, and the 
need for them to advance the human rights agenda within their own countries. The 
advocacy of democracy as a preferable mode of government stemmed from two 
sources: firstly, a normative belief in the ethical and humanist supremacy of that form 
of government; and secondly from the modernisationist understanding that liberal and 
transparent forms of governance are necessary for the efficient working of a market 
economy. Within this context, advocacy of human rights also assumes a dual 
function. 
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Tunisia reached such as agreement with Europe in 1995, which subsequently came 
into effect in 1996. At the time Tunisia was still reeling from the often violent assault 
by the regime on the Tunisian Islamist movement, known as Nahda. In rhetoric at 
least, however, the regime remained committed to a programme of democratisation, 
which included the promotion and protection of human rights. Enough reforms had 
been made to the political system for the EU to take the Tunisian intention seriously, 
and the issue of political conditionality did not hinder either European or Tunisian 
ratification of the agreement. Since then, however, Tunisia's human rights record has 
appeared to deteriorate rather than improve. The military, security and judicial 
services have been accused of acting for political purposes to harass, persecute, 
torture and illegally imprison opposition figures and human rights activists in an effort 
to defend the position of the present regime. Indeed, Tunisia now figures regularly in 
the reports of international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch. The list of reported violations of human rights is long: 
from torture, beatings and illegal imprisonment, to harassment, surveillance, the 
criminalisation of free speech, denial of appropriate legal representation, prolonged 
isolation, poor prison conditions, social and economic exclusion, and even extra-
judicial killings.2 
   
Similarly, progress towards democratisation appears to have stalled. While 
piecemeal reforms have allowed opposition party representation within the National 
Assembly, improved state funding for legal political parties, and even competition for 
the office of president, the reality of legal and political structures obstructs any real 
possibility for power-sharing, let along the transfer of power. Indeed, power has 
become ever more concentrated in the hands of the president himself, and his close 
circle of friends, family and advisers. In September 2001 he even felt sufficiently 
comfortable with his grasp over the system that he put forward a programme outlining 
his plans for a fourth, constitutionally illegal, term of office. 
   
Critics of the regime, both within and outside Tunisia, have repeatedly questioned 
why, given the terms of the Association Agreement, the EU has not been more vocal 
in its condemnation of their clear violation by the Tunisian government. Indeed, the 
European Parliament has proved remarkably resilient to pressures from INGOs and 
Tunisian NGOs to rebuke the Tunisian regime or, preferably, to apply sanctions 
against it. This article attempts to provide an answer to this question by examining the 
regime's defence of its actions and the EU's response to that defence. It examines the 
issue of human rights in Tunisia within the context of Tunisia's political development, 
most particularly since the constitutional coup of 1987 that led the current president, 
Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, to take office office. The paper highlights the dilemmas 
which the EU faces in applying judgement against regimes of SMPs, as well as the 
contradictions at the heart of the EU position. The regime's defence lies in three 
arguments: that it has taken a proactive role itself in promoting the culture and 
institutions that defend human rights and that these take time to take root in 
developing political societies; that the definition of human rights needs to include 
economic and social rights that may have to take sequential priority in countries at 
risk of political and economic destabilisation; and that the international human rights 
community is either deliberately or unwittingly intervening in Tunisia's domestic 
politics, which remain the sovereign preserve of the Tunisian state. All these 
arguments, and the counter-arguments posed by human rights organisations, pose 
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significant dilemmas for the EU which have not been addressed by the Barcelona 
framework. 
 
 
2. Tunisia under Bourguiba 
 
The Bourguibist era, from independence in 1956 until his removal from office in 
1987, was one dominated by the processes and problems of state-building. For our 
purposes, it is important to briefly reflect back upon this earlier period for a number of 
reasons, one of which stands head and shoulders above the rest. Bourguiba presided 
over the establishment of a single-party state which, despite its rhetoric, was devoid of 
genuine democratic structures and which promoted a political culture in which 
consensus around the politics and machinery of the state was elevated to the position 
of the prime national political virtue. Challengers to that orchestrated consensus were 
considered to be threats to both national security and the state-building process and 
were subsequently eliminated by either co-optational or repressive measures. Within 
the ruling party different trends emerged; a leftist or socialist grouping which lost its 
momentum after the decline of Ahmed Ben Salah; a liberal social-democratic trend 
represented by disaffected individuals within the party élite; and a bureaucratic party 
"old guard" that defended its privileges at all costs, resisting political reforms or 
economic rationalisations that might have damaged its capacity for distributing 
patronage. Competition between these trends was limited by Bourguiba's personal 
refusal to elevate any individual who might represent a particular trend to the position 
of appointed successor. When individuals sought to challenge Bourguiba's personal 
political domination or that of the ruling Neo-Destour/PSD party, they were forced to 
do so from exile (such as Ahmed Mestiri - founder of the Mouvement des Démocrates 
Socialistes) or to risk imprisonment and even assassination. 
 
National organisations, such as the main trade unions, faced similar constraints. 
Union leaders, like Habib Achour, who confronted the regime over its economic 
failures, found themselves replaced, harassed and even imprisoned. When they tried 
to develop associational identities and agendas that placed them at odds with those of 
the ruling party, they were rapidly disempowered. In instances (such as the January 
1978 riots) when union members took to the streets to demonstrate in favour of their 
leaders, they found themselves under attack from riot police and even the army. In 
that case, the regime went so far as to declare a state of emergency and to 
subsequently sentence Achour and 30 of his UGTT colleagues to harsh prison terms. 
 
In sum, the nature of Bourguiba's rule frustrated efforts by individuals and 
associations to develop a fully-fledged civil society. It also established the police and 
military as tools by which the regime could use coercive measures to contain political 
challenges. Military tribunals and a state security court (established in 1968) were 
used by the regime to by-pass the "independent" judiciary and the list of "political 
crimes" became progressively longer, with the prisons being filled with Ba'thists, 
leftists, liberals, unionists and eventually Islamists.  
 
The final years of Bourguiba's presidency were marked by an escalation of the 
tensions between state and civil society. Efforts to introduce austerity measures, 
including a hike in the price of bread, brought a week of rioting through much of the 
country. Economic crisis and political alienation combined to lend support to a 
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growing Islamist movement that had already been fomenting disturbances throughout 
the early eighties. For Bourguiba, Islamism was an absolute anathema, and he proved 
to be ruthless in his efforts to eradicate it from the Tunisian political arena. For the 
third time in six years, the army was brought in to quell the riots. Opposition 
newspapers were closed, union leaders were arrested and Bourguiba began a near-
rabid pursuit of the Islamist Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique (MTI). The 
opposition began finally to coalesce around the two issues on which they all - leftists, 
liberals and Islamists, could agree; the need for political reforms and the defence of 
human rights.  
 
In 1986 and 1987, the campaign against the Islamists intensified, with a series of 
mass arrests and show trials, leading to long-term imprisonments and - in some cases 
- to the death penalty. Bourguiba, determined to wipe out the Islamist challenge once 
and for all, sought to increase the number of execution orders, but his ministers - most 
prominent of whom was the prime minister, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, sought to 
restrain him for fear of the public response to such disproportionate measures. On 6th 
November 1987, Bourguiba was removed from office in a coup d'état, and Ben Ali 
took his place, claiming that the constitution required that Bourguiba, who had been 
declared mentally unfit to hold office by a group of doctors, be replaced. 
 
 
3. Political reform under Ben Ali 
 
It was clear to Ben Ali that Bourguiba had gone too far in his imposition of the state 
upon society. The national consensus had effectively disintegrated and the state itself 
had become the common enemy. Ben Ali realised, therefore, that to reconstruct the 
national consensus he would have to promise political reforms that would restore the 
balance to the state-civil society relationship. He consequently immediately abolished 
the presidency-for-life, and committed his regime to the restoration of constitutional 
government and the revision of that government to accommodate political pluralism, 
democratic government and respect for human and political rights. Prominent political 
prisoners were released, exiled opposition figures were invited to return, press rules 
were relaxed, amnesties were granted to thousands of other prisoners and suggestions 
were made that the state security court would be abolished.  
 
Political reform was to proceed along a number of paths. Firstly, the PSD itself was 
to be reformed to broaden its popular base and revive internal democratic structures. 
Secondly, a national dialogue was initiated with the still-illegal opposition parties 
(including the Islamists) to revive the national consensus and determine the new 
direction for the state. Finally electoral system reform would introduce political 
pluralism and democracy into government. 
 
Nearly fifteen years later, we can assess the results of the reforms subsequently 
undertaken. The results are profoundly discouraging since early optimism that Tunisia 
would democratise has turned into the disenchanted realisation that Ben Ali's Tunisia 
is becoming both more authoritarian than its predecessor and more capable of 
imposing that authoritarianism. 
 
The PSD was renamed the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD), 
reflecting an abandonment of previous socialist commitments and a supposed new 
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affinity to democratic practices. The sidelining of the older generation of party die-
hards opened new career paths for an ambitious younger generation that held no 
emotional attachment to the Bourguibist legacy and could adapt itself to the modern 
economic outlook of the Ben Ali regime. A massive recruitment drive based on 
promises of internal reform did succeed in enlarging and reviving the party, but 
manipulation of the party structures also subordinated it to the presidency. The 
introduction of multi-party politics has served to contain the political hegemony of the 
party, transferring that attribute to the president and his immediate circle. 
 
The national dialogue resulted in the 1988 National Pact, a document which 
committed all the agents of government and civil society to a common vision of a 
democratic, constitutional political system. It served to prevent the opposition from 
taking advantage of the economic crisis or the initial vulnerability of the new regime, 
co-opting them into a common vision that was then entrusted to the state for 
implementation. Those parties that pursued a vision in any way different from the one 
claimed by Ben Ali, notably the Islamists, were deemed to have fallen outside the 
consensus and to be dangerously divisive. Thus the MTI did not join the list of 
political parties legalised in 1988. Since it was the only organisation that could 
genuinely claim any mass popular support, the National Pact had effectively served to 
legitimise an order in which the only opposition allowed was that which presented no 
opposition.  
 
Electoral reform has been equally disappointing, although the government can 
justifiably claim that Ben Ali's regime has seen the first introduction of multi-party 
politics into Tunisian political life post-independence. The legalised opposition parties 
are weak and largely ineffective due to a number of factors. Firstly, they either have 
their roots in the now largely debunked ideologies of communism and socialism or in 
the personal power-bases of individuals who withdrew from the Neo-Destour/PSD at 
some time during the Bourguiba era. They can often draw on only regionalised 
support, and their credibility had been seriously damaged by a tendency on the part of 
their leading figures to accept posts within the RCD government in order to advance 
their personal ambitions. They present no real ideological or practical alternatives to 
the government and are so financially weak that they could not communicate any such 
platforms to the mass of the population even if they did have. The government has 
introduced an element of state funding for legal opposition parties that does help them 
to gain access to the media and to develop their (weak) organisational structures, but 
equally makes them indebted to, and dependent on, the government for their survival. 
At times, the opposition parties have even appeared ridiculous, tearing themselves 
apart over internal divisions that amount to little more than competition for places on 
party electoral lists. In the 1999 national elections, two parties offered candidates for 
the presidential elections (Mohamed Bel-Haj Amor of the Parti de l'Unité Populaire 
and Abderrahmane Tlili of the Union des Démocrates Unionistes) but neither offered 
a political agenda that differed from Ben Ali's. Their claim that standing for the 
presidency when they clearly couldn't win was part of the strategy of putting pressure 
on the regime to reform rather collapsed when Tlili suggested that he couldn't do the 
job any better than Ben Ali.  
 
Piece-meal reforms to the electoral system have failed to challenge RCD dominance, 
although they have allowed for a minority opposition voice in the legislature. The 
effect of this is marginal since power rests principally with the presidency, and 
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opposition representation in parliament has been reduced to a co-opted and rubber-
stamping role. The fact that the regime has "reserved" a minority proportion of seats 
for the opposition is indicative of these weaknesses although the regime would like to 
portray it as evidence of a commitment to plurality. In municipal elections the 
opposition parties have only been able to field candidates for a small percentage of 
seats, due to both financial and organisation constraints as well as a lack of a national 
support base. Thus the RCD continues to be the distributor of state patronage around 
the country and beyond the confines of urban centres like Tunis. 
 
The Islamists, meanwhile, who were the only political grouping able to mobilise a 
mass popular base, were refused legal status on the basis that their Islamic platform 
was potentially divisive through its mixing of religion with politics. Despite repeated 
proclamations that an Islamic party would be committed to democracy, the 
government decided that this represented mere opportunism on the part of the 
Islamists. Islamist candidates nonetheless stood as independent candidates in the 1989 
elections, winning at least 13 per cent3 of the votes. Frustrations over their failure to 
have a clear electoral success translated into any official recognition fuelled a militant 
wing of the Islamist movement, just as events in neighbouring Algeria were serving to 
strengthen regime (and popular) opposition to allowing Islamists a political role. The 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent American-led war against Iraq led Islamist 
leaders like Rachid Ghannouchi to fiercely defend Iraq while bitterly railing against 
the Saudi and Kuwaiti regimes for consorting with infidel armies against a Muslim 
brother state. The Tunisian regime, aware that it might too become a target for such 
criticism and conscious also that Gulf investment finances were at risk, used the 
occasion to turn against the Islamists, arresting and imprisoning both leading figures 
and suspected members of the Islamist movement, now renamed Nahda, by the 
hundreds. The regime claimed that the Islamists were responsible for a number of 
violent attacks and demonstrations and that they planned a violent coup that would 
install an Islamic government. The Islamists and their supporters responded by 
accusing the government of taking the opportunity to demolish the only real 
opposition in Tunisia. They claimed that Islamist prisoners were tortured, that trials 
were held in secret, that prisoners had no access to appropriate legal support, that 
verdicts were politically motivated, and that the regime abused the legal system in 
order to secure convictions. By 1993 Amnesty International claimed that there were 
around 8,000 political detainees in Tunisia, while Islamists put the figure closer to 
30,000. 
 
The attack on the Islamists was accompanied by a new wave of media repression. 
The press had enjoyed a honeymoon with Ben Ali until this time, with an easing of 
press restrictions and an apparent rejection of the sycophancy that had marked media 
coverage of the presidency under Bourguiba. In 1991, however, newspapers were 
once again seized, journalists harassed (or in the case of foreign journalists expelled), 
newspaper offices were attacked, searched and closed, and accreditation and passports 
were withdrawn from those who dared criticise the government. This feature of the 
country has remained true until this day. Although the regime has made a particular 
effort in recent years to stress its desire to see a more professional and less 
acquiescent press in Tunisia, amending the press code to that effect (at least to some 
extent), the reality of its actions has led to stringent self-censorship on the part of the 
media. International journalist's organisations such as the Committee to Protect 
Journalists have "named and shamed" the regime, which nonetheless continues to 
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argue that the sheer number of publications available in Tunis, and the international 
origin of many of those publications, demonstrates a greater openness to the press 
than the government is credited with. The issue has become more sensitive still since 
the attempted assassination of the journalist, Riad ben Fahdel, in May 2000, just days 
after he published an article critical of the president. A still more recent example is the 
harassment by the regime of the human rights activist, Sihem Bensedrine, who took 
part in an al-Jazeera television programme in which she high-lighted human rights 
abuses by the Tunisian regime. She subsequently had her telephone tampered with, 
received threatening and obscene calls, and was detained by the police for a number 
of days. She still faces trial on defamation charges. The regime subsequently 
organised a televised discussion on issues of democracy, human rights, press freedom 
and the role of the judiciary. This was presented as a watershed in how the state 
television will cover political issues, but the fact remains that genuinely independent 
journalists are easy prey for the regime. 
 
Once the Islamists had been forced into deep cover by the brutal wave of repression, 
the regime appeared to turn on the secular opposition. Given the relative docility of 
that group, many observers have been hard pushed to explain this feature of the 
regime. It may lie partly in the fact that a number of the more prominent liberal 
opposition figures have played significant roles in the development of the human 
rights discourse in Tunisia. Some, like Ahmed Mestiri, Moncef Marzouki, Khemais 
Ksila and Mohamed Moadda of the MDS have played leading roles in the Ligue 
Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme and more lately in the Tunisian National Council 
for Liberty. Individuals like these have become the vanguard of struggles to get the 
regime to honour its commitments to democracy. Like many others, they have all 
been repeatedly arrested, detained, tried and imprisoned on charges such as belonging 
to an illegal organisation, defamation, working for a foreign (Libyan) government etc. 
Their crimes have been to publicise the human rights abuses within Tunisia and to 
publicly criticise the regime for them, and to call upon it to implement the genuine 
political reforms that were promised in 1987 that would lead to democratisation and 
the rule of law. Given the weakness of established political opposition parties, and 
their inability to make any significant dent in the regime's control over the political 
arena, such individuals have challenged the regime through human rights and civil 
liberties organisations. These have the benefit of drawing support from across the 
political spectrum, putting Islamists, liberals and communists into common cause. 
Moreover, they draw greater international attention and support. Finally, they engage 
in a discourse which the regime is hard-pushed to de-legitimise. Indeed, the regime 
claims that it too stands for democratisation, pluralism and human rights so its efforts 
to discredit or undermine these organisations are that much harder to sustain. That has 
not, however, meant that it has given up trying!  
 
In 1992 the regime tried to use the then-new Law of Associations to control the 
membership of the LTDH. Among other things, this would have prevented members 
of political parties from joining the organisation, depriving it of its political 
leadership. Although the government was in that instance forced to back down, the 
LTDH leadership was eventually replaced by a more moderate group which felt that 
they could only continue their work defending human rights if they lowered the level 
of confrontation with the regime. The more political personalities refocused their 
attention on the Comité National pour la Défense des Prisonniers d'Opinion 
(CNDPO) formed by Moncef Marzouki and later the National Council for Liberty in 
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Tunisia (CNLT), formed in 1998. The organisation nonetheless soon found itself once 
more at odds with the regime. The Fifth Congress of the LTDH, held in October 2000, 
resulted in the election of a more independent leadership. In December, four LTDH 
members with links to the government challenged the validity of the Congress 
election results, a challenge that was upheld in February 2001 by the second chamber 
of the Court of first instance. The court declared that a new Congress should be held 
at which a new executive committee should be elected and that the LTDH was to be 
placed under judicial administration. The offices of the League have been closed 
down. Simultaneously the members of the now-dissolved LTDH leadership have been 
harassed, beaten, threatened, arrested and detained. Likewise, members of the 
unrecognised CNLT have been arrested, tried and sentenced for membership of an 
illegal organisation. Its spokesman, Moncef Marzouki, has for example been 
sentenced to one year imprisonment for allegedly "spreading false information" and 
"maintaining an unauthorised association". The CNLT offices and the homes of its 
members have been surrounded by police a number of times. Meetings have been 
banned, and individuals have been physically prevented from attending them. 
 
Under particular attack from the regime have been lawyers who have defended what 
they consider to be political prisoners. Some, like Najib Hosni, have been imprisoned 
under charges of unauthorised legal practices (read, defending Islamists). Others, like 
Naziha Boudhib,claim they have been physically assaulted by security agents. Nejib 
Hosni was banned by the courts from practising law and, when he ignored the ruling, 
was imprisoned. Anouar Kousri, a vice-president of the LTDH, found himself under 
surveillance when he defended a young man who subsequently died in police custody. 
 
Not surprisingly the Tunisian regime is drawing ever-stronger criticism for its 
performance in the human rights domain. Amnesty International still claims that there 
are over a thousand political prisoners in Tunisia, subject to "cruel, inhuman and 
degrading conditions"4 that regularly include torture. Even when released, they are 
subjected to routine and arbitrary measures that prevent them from working or earning 
a living, from moving freely within or out of the country. The courts clearly fail to 
protect the human rights of individuals and the security apparatus appears to be 
beyond the law and subject to no public accountability whatsoever.5 
 
 
4. The case for the regime 
 
The Tunisian government does not recognise the dismal picture drawn by the 
international human rights organisations. Instead, it organises its defence along four 
lines. Firstly, it has itself acknowledged that defending the human rights of its citizens 
is one of the primary obligations of the state. To this end, it has introduced a number 
of measures and institutions designed to advance the observance of human rights by 
the state. Secondly, the regime has been at pains to advance a broad definition of 
human rights that includes economic and social rights. When their attainment for the 
majority of citizens has been at the expense of the political rights of a few 
"troublesome" or "subversive" individuals, then the regime has claimed that this is a 
legitimate, even necessary, price to pay. Thirdly, the regime has argued that the 
international human rights organisations have fallen victim to the political 
machinations of the opposition in Tunisia, not least the Islamist opposition, who seek 
to pull down the regime and who make false accusations that draw international 
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criticism as part of their strategy. Finally, the regime has argued that its own domestic 
politics are really none of anyone else's business. When the EU in particular has been 
drawn into the debate, the Tunisian government has strongly rejected its claim to a 
right to intervene. 
 
 
4.1 The regime defends human rights 
 
The Tunisian regime can certainly point to the long list of measures that it has 
introduced to advance the status of human rights in its list of priorities. On the official 
Tunisian web site,6 human rights are listed at the top of the agenda, with a statement 
to that effect on the very first page, next to the commitment to democratic forms of 
government. A dedicated page on human rights lists twelve realms in which the state 
has taken action to promote human rights, ranging from civil and political rights, 
through the spectrum of economic and social rights, to its relations with human rights 
organisations and international conventions. In terms of civil and political rights, one 
of the first actions taken by Ben Ali as president in 1987 was to abolish the State 
Security and Emergency Courts, as well as the State Prosecutor's Office. He also 
created a Constitutional Council to review constitutional matters and make 
recommendations. A 1998 amendment to the relevant act made the decisions of this 
body binding on powers and authorities. In 1989, and in line with the ratification of 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture, forced labour was abolished, as were 
rehabilitative and civil labour in 1995. The system of administrative justice was 
reformed in 1995 and in 1987 and 1993 amendments were made to the penal 
procedures to improve the system of penal custody and preventive detention. The 
period for which a detainee could be held was reduced to three days, renewable once. 
In 2000 the President announced that the administration of penitentiary and re-
education centres would move to the Ministry of Justice, together with the 
establishment of a new judicial framework relating to custody and preventive custody 
ensuring the detainee judicial protection 
 
More proactive activities have included the creation of a new post, that of Minister-
Delegate to the Prime Minister in Charge of Human Rights, Communications and 
Relations with the Chamber of Deputies. Ben Ali also established a Higher 
Committee for Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties in 1991, which makes 
suggestions for the improvement of human rights observance in the country.7 The 
president of this committee presents an annual report to Ben Ali on the situation in the 
country, with recommendations. Human Rights Units have been established in the 
Ministries of Justice, Interior and Foreign Affairs (in 1992), and a National 
Committee for Education in Human Rights was established (in 1996) to disseminate 
information about human rights, the idea being that the culture of human rights has to 
be established throughout the country before the fact. In 1992 a new Center for 
Juridical and Judicial Studies was created, and in 1996 a National School for the 
Prison and Rehabilitation Services was set up to provide training in human rights. In 
1997, the government went as far as to create a designated Chair in Human Rights at 
the University of Tunis. Finally, it has authorised the publication of a number of 
books by the Higher Committee and National Committee to help in the education 
process.  
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The regime has furthermore repeatedly committed itself to international treaties and 
agreements that stipulate the protection of human rights, such as the Constitutive Act 
of the African Union (adopted by African states on July 11th 2000). It has participated 
fully in the international human rights debate, hosting major conferences such as the 
1992 UNESCO First International Forum on "Education for Democracy", the 1992 
United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, and the 1993 Arab Conference 
on "Education in the Field of Human Rights". 
 
Since Ben Ali's accession to power, the Press Code has been amended three times, 
most recently in May 2001, with a reduction in the number of possible press offences, 
new press registration procedures, and protection from defamation by the press. It has 
also been stipulated that suspension of publication can only occur subject to proper 
judicial procedures. The government has also introduced other measures, which it 
claims have improved the legislative, structural and technical aspects of media 
communication in Tunisia. Ben Ali himself has repeatedly called on the press to be 
less servile and to promote genuine debate within the country. 
 
The regime has further pointed out that opposition parties were only legalised under 
the current president, and that their representation in parliament now amount to a 
guaranteed twenty per cent of the seats despite their poor showing in the polls. Sixty 
electoral districts now have plural representation at the municipal level, with 243 
opposition council members serving across the country. Women account for 12 per 
cent of the total members of the national parliament and twenty per cent of the slates 
of the RCD in the last election were allocated to women. The current regime 
introduced a special ministerial post devoted to women's needs and introduced women 
to the council for the first time. In the last national elections, the opposition fielded 
candidates for the presidency for the first time, and Ben Ali has limited the 
presidential office to three consecutive terms. Opposition members of parliament have 
been invited to serve in cabinet and political parties receive a state subsidy to help 
them overcome the handicaps of their small size and organisational weaknesses.  
 
In sum, the regime is clearly heavily engaged in the human rights discourse, (to the 
extent that critics have said that the country has a human rights discourse, but no 
human rights). Critics might point out that the state has tried to establish a monopoly 
over that discourse, appropriating for itself the right to define what constitute human 
rights, to educate the population in that definition, and then to determine the pace and 
scope of the implementation of its commitments. If all of these tasks fall to the state, 
then what role is left for independent human rights organisations or even wider civil 
society organisations? 
 
4.2 Defining human rights 
 
A key aspect of this defence is the definition of democracy, political pluralism and 
human rights, which refers first and foremost to the notion of respect by the 
opposition for the rule of law. In an interview in June 2001 Ben Ali said: 
 
“It should be recalled that democracy is a system which encompasses rules 
and mechanisms aimed at organising public life with all its components in 
order to prevent anarchy. Equally no democracy is possible without the rule 
of law which applies to all without exception…I wish to recall in the same 
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context, that the right to be different and to set up parties and organisations 
is guaranteed but it could not be consecrated if it is in anyway violated.”8 
 
For Ben Ali, the political rights of individuals and organisations only exist as long as 
they acknowledge their obligations to the rule of law as determined by the state (re: 
his own regime). He claims that the government is making steady progress towards 
democratisation. Political activity is only legitimate if it contributes towards this 
steady progress, the pace of which is determined by the regime with an eye towards 
preserving stability throughout the period of political and economic transition. Any 
political activity that challenges this stability, by undermining the regime or its 
interpretation of the law, is considered to be illegitimate and threatening to society. Of 
particular concern are those activities which have the potential or actual capacity for 
violence, a trait that the regime has consistently attributed to the Islamist movement. 
Violence and subversion are threatening to all of society and are therefore not 
considered to be political crimes. For example, in an interview with Middle East 
Policy9, Ben Ali stated the following: 
 
“Let us be clear about the fact that there are no political prisoners in 
Tunisia. All those in prison are there for common law crimes. They have 
been judged by the ordinary courts in accordance with ordinary procedures 
and in application of the law, and have been found guilty of established 
actions involving in most cases terrorism or aggravated violence, or related 
to the preparation of acts of violence directed at overthrowing the 
republican regime”. 
 
This interpretation of democracy and political pluralism is enshrined in the National 
Pact itself, to which the legal opposition are themselves bound. The pact says: 
 
“It is the responsibility of the state to guarantee other fundamental liberties 
such as the freedom of assembly and freedom to set up associations and 
political parties; provided that these freedoms are exercised within the law, 
they may be limited only by the requirements of democratic society and 
public order, and by the rights and freedoms of others and the requirement 
of non-allegiance to any foreign party.”10 
 
The pact goes on to assert that protecting these freedoms entails the prohibition of 
all forms of extremism, of any efforts to entwine religion and politics, and of any 
efforts on the part of political parties, associations or other organisations to interfere 
with or replace the activities of the state institutions. Since the state itself is 
supposedly the product of periodic and free elections, its own actions are an 
expression of the will of the majority (although protecting the rights of minorities) 
and are therefore not subject to challenges. 
 
The second aspect of the definition of human rights relates to what the regime states 
is the major task of the government, to ensure the economic and social development 
of the country. On the official web site mentioned earlier, the list of activities 
undertaken by the government to improve the human rights situation included actions 
in spheres not normally associated with human rights; education, health, social 
welfare, and better provision for women, the elderly, children and the handicapped. 
When Ben Ali took over from Bourguiba the country was clearly in an economic 
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shambles, with the gains of early independence having been eroded through wasteful 
state management, interest on excessive borrowing, the decline in oil prices and the 
consequent drop in demand for Tunisian migrant labour. Since then a succession of 
development plans have been implemented that seek to balance the necessary 
restructuring of the economy with adequate and targeted social provision to protect 
the interests of the most vulnerable sections of the population. This has not been an 
easy juggling act but by and large the regime has successfully reformed the economy 
to enhance its international trade profile, restore fiscal balance, contain inflation and 
reduce the role and size of the public sector. There have of course been costs for 
society - such as unemployment, rising income taxes, demands for private 
contributions to educational and health costs, and a squeeze on the housing market. 
For the most part these have been borne by the relatively large middle classes, with 
targeted social provision protecting the poor from the effects of subsidy reductions. 
The reforms are not therefore universally popular, although there is a widespread 
recognition that things could not have continued as they were and that there are few 
real alternatives to the present strategy. This emphasis on the long-term 
developmental benefits of economic restructuring has been the cornerstone of the 
present regime's appeals for legitimacy. However, development has been more widely 
defined to include social development, such as the advancement of the rights of, and 
provision for, vulnerable groups in society - women, children, the elderly and the 
handicapped. Ben Ali's government has repeatedly stressed that genuine economic 
development is only possible if it takes place in tandem with progressive 
commitments to advance the conditions of ALL the country's citizens, with the 
ultimate goal being a modern, secular, democratic society. There is a political 
message here - that democracy is only possible when society has been sufficiently 
(re)educated to cast off "regressive", traditional, conservative, or religious attitudes 
and norms that serve only to perpetuate divisions, intolerance and inequalities. Thus 
the regime defends itself from Islamist challenges!  
 
Those who challenge the state, as it tries to move society and economy forward in 
this way, are considered to be challenging the economic and social interests of society 
as a whole, threatening to hold back or even reverse the progress made under the 
current regime. Thus, it can be argued, while they stamp and stomp about their 
political and human rights being abused, they are in effect opposing the advancement 
of a much broader set of "rights" for a whole society in an effort to improve their 
individual rights. Moreover, they challenge the notion of a sequential ordering of 
rights. For Ben Ali, full political rights are a luxury which can only be enjoyed once 
society is sufficiently advanced (economically and socially) as to be able to absorb the 
potentially disruptive effects of political competition without destabilisation. His 
interpretation has found some sympathy with Tunisians and Europeans who look 
nervously at the Algerian experience in which democratisation moves that empowered 
Islamists were suddenly reversed by a much-threatened secular army, resulting in 
prolonged and bloody civil war. 
 
4.3 International organisations as tools of the opposition 
 
This argument seeks to discredit those who use the human rights discourse as a way 
to challenge the legitimacy of the regime itself. They are portrayed as dangerous and 
dishonest, as being more concerned with their individual rights than with society's 
interests as a whole. In Ben Ali's own words, they are: "professsional liemongers and 
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lovers of speeches, press communiqués and salon professionals".11 They are 
frequently accused of working for foreign powers - for example, Mohamed Mouadda 
was imprisoned for allegedly conspiring with the Libyan government. In May 2001, 
the President denounced the "use of human rights as a pretext, particularly to feed 
malicious smear campaigns…by some who have mortgaged their conscience to serve 
certain quarters outside their country".12 Thus, international organisations such as 
Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, become the unwitting dupes of both 
internal and external political opposition. By constantly pointing out the failings of 
the regime, and allegedly exaggerating them on the basis of "dubious" evidence 
supplied by politically-motivated individuals, they are undermining the legitimate 
efforts of the regime to advance the human rights agenda in a sustainable way. The 
Islamists are considered to particularly guilty, feeding on the democratic concerns of 
the liberal chattering classes to win rights which they will ultimately use to seize 
power and deny others those same rights. 
 
4.4 International intervention in domestic affairs 
 
Not surprisingly then, the regime has objected strongly to the efforts of Western 
European governments to provide refuge for Islamist opposition figures, and their 
repeated "official" criticism of the government's record on human rights. The 
president has complained that Britain, France and the United States have "given 
asylum to the enemies of freedom and democracy"13 even as they have applied double 
standards by failing to sufficiently criticise the Israeli abuse of Palestinian human 
rights while over-stating the case against Tunisia: 
 
“As happens in any other human society, nobody could state that in Tunisia 
there are no excesses or cases of abuse of power. But these are fairly rare, 
isolated cases which we have always unhesitatingly curbed by legal 
means.”
14
 
 
The Tunisian Government has been particularly stung by the harsh statements that 
have been issued by the European Parliament. These have been in response to 
repeated pleas for intervention from international and Tunisian human rights workers 
and are grounded in the respect for democratic principles and fundamental liberties 
that are supposedly enshrined in the Association Agreement between the EU and 
Tunisia. Oraganisations like Amnesty International have been eager to promote this 
aspect of Euro-Med relations to a level comparable with European interest in the 
economic and security aspects of the agreements.15 
 
In 1996, the EU harshly reprimanded the government when opposition leader 
Mohamed Mouadda, was imprisoned after publishing an open letter in which he 
condemned the deterioration of the human rights situation and civil liberties during 
Ben Ali's leadership. The strength of international pressure on Tunisia, which at the 
time was newly embarking upon its Association Agreement with Europe, sufficed in 
that instance to see Mouadda released after serving fifteen months of an eleven year 
sentence. (Mouadda was nonetheless subjected to house arrest, harassment, a ban on 
participating in political activities, and denied access to foreign visitors, eventually 
resorting to a hunger strike that left him in hospital. His continued calls for greater 
political freedoms led to his re-arrest and return to jail in June 2001). Although he 
demurred in Mouadda's initial early release, Ben Ali made it clear to his EU partners 
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in a major speech in 1998 that "it is necessary that all parties respect the social and 
cultural specificities of one another" and that they recognise the need for "gradualism 
and state-by-stage progression" in the transition to democracy.16 Similarly, in 1995 he 
said: 
 
“We respect the nobility of activism and we are attached to constructive 
dialogue, within the framework of respect for states' sovereignty and their 
national choices, as much as we reject any form of deviation which harms 
the very essence of a humanitarian issue which concerns the entire mankind, 
that of human rights.”17 
 
In December 2000, the European Parliament passed a further two resolutions 
alerting its member governments to abuses of human rights in Tunisia and urgently 
demanding a meeting of the European Union-Tunisian Association Council to discuss 
the situation. In that instance a satisfactory response from Tunisia was less forth-
coming. If anything the opposite was the case when, in January 2001, the regime 
expelled Me Eric Plouvier, who had been commissioned by the Observer to the Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network to observe the trial of the LTDH. The 
expulsion was a clear message that the EU's interference in Tunisian domestic affairs 
was unwelcome. In September 2001 Amnesty International complained that two of its 
own delegates, visiting Tunisia to monitor the appeal hearings of veteran human 
rights activist Moncef Marzouki and trade unionist Lotfi Idoudi, had been 
apprehended and assaulted by plain-clothes policemen. The willingness of the 
security services to take active steps to impede international observers suggests that 
the failure of the EU to place active sanctions against the regime has been interpreted 
as a "green light" to resist intervention by human rights organisations.   
 
 
5. Questions that need to be answered 
 
Herein lies the dilemma for the EU in its dealings with Tunisia. The EU is 
committed, for both normative and modernisationist purposes, to pushing the human 
rights agenda in its partner countries. Yet so far it has failed to take action against 
those partner countries, like Tunisia, which have not lived up to their own 
commitments under the Barcelona Declaration and in the terms of Association 
Agreements.  
 
The reasons for this are manifold. The EU recognises, indeed sympathises with, the 
need to maintain political stability through the difficult period of economic transition. 
It is clearly a delicate time for such governments, which are after all applying the 
prescriptions set down by the more advanced economies. This means accepting that 
political democratisation may have to be delayed, or at least very gradually 
introduced, in order to contain resistance to economic reforms and prevent socio-
economic "pain" from translating into political disruption. A sub-text is that the EU 
recognises full well that real democratisation may yet offer Islamists a route to 
power.18 This is seen as threatening to European interests, as well as offering the 
longer-term reversal of whatever political liberalisation gains have been made in the 
MENA region. The EU finds itself forced to acknowledge that full-scale 
democratisation may be desirable in principle but may be damaging to its own 
interests in the short-medium term. Thus it is all to easy to accept the argument that 
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gradual implementation with a long-term horizon is both more practical and desirable, 
even if that relieves authoritarian regimes of the pressure to decentralise or share 
power. Equally, that some sequencing of human rights delivery is inevitable, even in 
the best of cases.  
 
This concession to self-interest on the part of the EU only serves to high-light the 
double standards applied when it comes to human rights issues, at least in the eyes of 
the Arab and Islamic worlds. The argument goes something like this: Israeli human 
rights abuses in the Occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem are far more 
regular and heinous than the much more infrequent abuses within countries like 
Tunisia. After all, the current Intifada saw over 700 Palestinians killed in the first 
year, including women and children. Yet the international community does not 
sanction Israel. Instead it relegates the problem to a bilateral issue for negotiation 
between Israel and the far weaker Palestinians. EU policy towards SMPs is equally 
hypocritical. They speak with a loud voice when it comes to designing Association 
Agreements, then fail to insist on the implementation of democratisation and human 
rights when their own economic interests are threatened. The EU asserts that cultural 
variations are irrelevant (offering ammunition for critics of cultural imperialism) and 
yet it supports an effective regional variation in the level of political and human rights 
which it is prepared to actively support. It appears that the normative aspects of EU 
human rights policies take a very firm second-place to practical and self-interested 
perceptions of how political and human rights relate to economic development, 
reducing the overall credibility of the EU's position. 
 
Political conditionality can be seen as having two facets. Negative conditionality 
refers to the imposing of sanctions, or punishments, on regimes that fail to meet the 
required standards. Clearly, the EU has been unwilling to bear the costs to itself of 
such negative conditionality. Positive conditionality, on the other hands, implies 
taking measures to encourage or reward success in meeting the standards required. 
This take the form of, for example, financial grants for education programmes, 
conferences, civil society organisations and government programmes that improve 
political and human rights. In countries like Tunisia, however, where the regime has 
tried to silence and dis-empower independent political opposition and human rights 
groups, this can result in the financial reinforcement of state machinery rather than in 
an improved dialogue between it and civil society. If the EU tries to support 
independent groups, it incurs the wrath and obstructive manoeuvrings of the regime. 
The Barcelona formula contains a basic design fault in that it relies on the willingness 
of non-democratic regimes to introduce new political structures that will reduce their 
own capacities, yet provides no real incentive for them to do so and includes no real 
mechanism for sanctioning them if they don't. 
 
The EU may need to rethink some of its own basic assumptions. Is it appropriate to 
abandon a normative agenda if the bottom line is that your member states are 
unwilling to assert its supremacy over self-interest? If one accepts the argument that 
political stability must take priority at the present time, is it necessary to consider 
which rights should take priority? Are negative rights (freedom from…) more 
important in the immediate term than positive rights (freedom to…) and should the 
EU settle for good performance with regards to the former rather than pushing 
unsuccessfully for better performance with regards to the latter? One could argue that 
a more limited rights agenda would be more successful and more credible. Regimes 
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could respond without losing their own power over society, maintaining stability and 
developing a phased response to domestic political demands.  
 
If the normative agenda is considered to be paramount, then the EU needs to 
establish the price that it is prepared to pay in order to see that agenda successfully 
implemented. Economic sanctions contain an inherent bias against peoples rather than 
regimes, so it is hard to see how they might help in this instance. It is equally hard to 
see how the EU could advance its contributions to the civil societies of SMP without 
the co-operation of regimes, or rather in the face of regime hostility.  
 
Equally the EU needs to clarify its position towards political Islam and Islamist 
movements. Are they to be a part of the civil societies that are supported by the EU in 
its efforts to encourage regional democratisation? Are they to be excluded on the 
grounds that the EU has no faith in their commitment to democracy and fears their 
influence on our domestic Muslim populations? The first strategy carries risks, 
including the likelihood that regional regimes will be profoundly alienated, while the 
second strategy completely demolishes the credibility of our own commitment to 
democracy and pluralism.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
These are complex questions, but it would be a mistake to delay their serious 
consideration and resolution indefinitely. The Tunisian case is a clear example of a 
regime consolidating its authoritarian hold over society and progressively eroding the 
capacity of civil society to defend its political and human rights, while simultaneously 
enjoying the financial support of the EU through an Association Agreement. Not only 
is the current strategy self-defeating, it also contains the seeds of future popular 
resentment against the EU for its collaboration in economic and political processes 
that benefit the few rather than the masses. This is a harsh critique, but the EU should 
not under-estimate the difference between its own view of its intentions and how they 
are perceived by the recipient populations in SMPs. The sooner that the ambiguities 
and inconsistencies in EU human rights policies are recognised and resolved, the 
better for both sides of the Mediterranean. 
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